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  It is a great pleasure to report on the 
conference on “Expectations, Learning 
and Monetary Policy” sponsored jointly 
by the Center for Financial Studies and 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. First of all, 
thanks are due to Athanasios Orphanides 
(Board of Governors of the 
Federal  Reserve  System) 
and John C. Williams (Fe- 
deral  Reserve  Bank  of 
San Francisco) for taking 
on the lion‘s share of the 
work involved in putting 
together an excellent pro-
gram that included many 
of the leading experts on 
this topic from academia as 
well as policy institutions. 
Furthermore,  I  would  like  to  thank 
Heinz  Herrmann  from  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank for the excellent collabo-
ration in the organisation of this joint 
event.
  The presentations and lively discus-
sion at the conference clearly showed 
that  this  is  a  vibrant  and  technically 
challenging area of research that is also 
of great relevance for the practice of 
monetary policy. Thus, it constitutes a 
perfect example of CFS´ commitment   
 
 
 
to  bring  first-rate  academic  research 
to  bear  on  policy  issues  of  practical 
concern. 
  This booklet is intended both as a 
reminder of the promising discussions 
and  visions  expressed  at 
the conference and as an 
advertisement announcing 
the volume in preparation. 
The  papers  presented  at   
this conference have under-
gone a rigorous refereeing 
process  at  the  Journal 
of  Economic  Dynamics  and 
Control (JEDC) that is soon 
coming  to  a  close.  All 
papers that pass this mark 
will appear in a special JEDC issue to be 
published in 2005. JEDC is one of the 
most-cited journals in economics hav-
ing recently been ranked as number 23 
among 300 scientific journals in economics 
in  a  study  sponsored  by  the  European 
Economic Association. The quality of the 
journal and the quality of the papers will 
ensure that this volume will have a signifi-
cant impact on research as well as mone-
tary policy practice.
Volker Wieland
(Center for Financial Studies and 
University of Frankfurt)
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question of how fast a change in mone-
tary strategy should be implemented, for 
example, has always been a contentious 
one, both at the Bundesbank and at other 
central banks. Advocates of a “cold-tur-
key” strategy have always argued with 
advocates of a gradual change of course. 
In the end, sensitivity and tact have played 
a vital role in making such decisions.
  I think that the questions to be dealt 
with  at  this  conference  are  therefore 
important for practical policymaking in 
this respect as well. I hope the confer-
ence will help provide monetary policy   
making,  which  will  always  remain  an 
art, a more scientific foundation. The 
two examples taken from the early phase 
of monetary targeting in Germany have 
shown  that  there  has  always  been  an 
awareness that both central banks and the 
public need to learn. Both are naturally 
not independent of one another. How 
the  behaviour  of  these  two  players 
affect each other will, I assume, be an 
important part of your conference. 
  It seems to me that in the past few 
years the academic discussion has been 
primarily concerned with the question 
as  to  what  the  consequences  are 
when the private sector does not have 
complete access to all the information 
concerning the behaviour of monetary 
policymakers.  Such  discussions  have 
quickly  led  to  demands  for  monetary 
policy making to be as transparent as 
possible. However, transparency, with 
regard  to  monetary  policy,  has  many 
facets. These range from the demand 
for clear goals, transparent strategies all 
the way to the plea for clear procedures 
on  implementing  and  communicating 
monetary policy measures.
  Today, central banks around the world 
recognise the value of transparency. It is 
generally accepted that central banks must 
endeavour to make their policies under-
standable to the public. In the light of the 
large degree of independence granted to 
monetary policymakers, at least in many 
industrial countries, this is not only a 
democratic  duty;  it  also  supports  the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.   
  In  my  view,  the  most  important 
point of this discussion is that the public 
should have no doubts as to the goals 
of monetary policy. Efforts were made 
to ensure clarity in European monetary 
union from the very start. The main goal 
is price stability and may not be jeop-
ardised  by  any  other  considerations. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) also 
explained from the very start what it 
meant by price stability – consumer price 
inflation  below  2%.  Incidentally,  this 
Ladies and gentlemen
  I  am  pleased  to  welcome  you  to 
the  Training  Centre  of  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank here in Eltville; the training 
centre is here to keep central bankers 
up to date on the latest developments. 
I expect that we, too, will learn some-
thing useful for our monetary policy in 
the next few days. This location is there-
fore  the  ideal  place  for  a  conference 
whose theme is “Expectations, Learning 
and Monetary Policy”.
  I am pleased that Athanasios Orpha-
nides and John Williams took on the task 
of making most of the preparations for 
this  conference.  The  Bundesbank  and 
the Center for Financial Studies were 
happy to support this endeavour. 
  As we have all known for some time 
now, expectations play a pivotal role in 
monetary policy making and in economic 
policy making in general. It is certainly 
a generally recognised fact that learning 
also  plays  an  important  role  in  these 
areas. 
  In  1975,  for  example,  when  the 
Bundesbank introduced what was then 
its new strategy of monetary targeting, 
it first spoke of it as an “experiment”, 
from which both the Bundesbank and 
the public would have to gain experi-
ence. It continued to use this word in 
connection with its concept for a good 
number of years thereafter.
  This  may  come  as  somewhat  of  a 
surprise given the tenacity with which 
the  Bundesbank  stuck  to  its  strategy 
right up to monetary union. However, 
policymakers were aware that by chang-
ing strategies too quickly, as we have cer-
tainly seen other central banks do in the 
past, the public becomes confused and 
monetary policy may lose its credibility.
  Allow me to cite another example: 
after introducing monetary targets, the 
Bundesbank, in line with this strategy, 
only  gradually  reduced  its  inflation 
target to 2%. It took ten years for this 
target to be reduced from initially 5% –
6% to the final goal of 2%. Later on, the 
Bundesbank continued to hold on to this 
normative inflation goal, even when the 
actual inflation rate was much higher. 
The  Bundesbank’s  awareness  that  the 
public has to be given a chance to learn 
gradually was always coupled with the 
feeling that it must also give the public 
clear guidance.
  These comments should not be mis-
construed to mean that central bankers 
have  always  known  everything.  The 
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Knowledge of the transmission process 
in monetary union was as incomplete as 
that of the issues regarding the stability 
of the demand for money. Against this 
background, the ECB chose a two-pil-
lar strategy. However, this two-pillar 
strategy has been criticised, especially by 
advocates of a direct inflation targeting 
approach for its lack of transparency.
  Within the framework of the strategic 
review, the ECB has therefore once again 
made  clear  how  it  views  the  interplay 
between “economic analysis” and “mone-
tary analysis” and what these two aspects 
entail.  Economic  analysis  is  particularly 
concerned with factors influencing the 
price  formation  process  in  the  short 
and medium term, such as the demand 
situation or the cost situation. Monetary 
analysis, by contrast, focuses more on 
medium and long-term aspects. 
  At the same time, it was emphasised 
that merely comparing actual monetary 
growth  and  reference  values  is  not 
enough. It is much more important to 
recognise  underlying  monetary  trends 
which influence price movements in the 
long term and to differentiate them from 
temporary disturbances. This requires, 
for example, a supplementary analysis 
of both households’ portfolio decisions 
and the development of lending in an   
economy.
  The  demands  for  strategic  trans-
parency, as sometimes formulated by 
academics  in  particular,  are  at  times 
quite  extensive.  Some  demand,  for 
example,  that  central  banks  disclose 
the  models  on  which  their  decisions 
are  based.  I  think  such  a  demand  is 
naive, not only because no one model 
can answer all the questions a central 
bank  is  faced  with.  Given  the  many 
unanswered  questions  confronting   
economic research itself, there is also 
no alternative to using diverse methods. 
The Eurosystem, for example, uses a 
wide spectrum of analytical methods to 
make its forecasts1. The question is, of 
course, how these different analytical 
instruments are combined into a single 
whole. 
definition came as no surprise; most of 
the national central banks which entered 
monetary union had previously estab-
lished this target for themselves as well. 
The experience of the past few decades, 
not to mention centuries, during which 
high  inflation  rates  have  often  been 
witnessed, has undoubtedly left its mark 
on both central banks and the public. It 
was therefore no surprise that the ECB 
first  and  foremost  accentuated  what 
it  views  as  a  tolerable  inflation-rate 
ceiling.  Nonetheless,  there  has  never 
been any doubt that one of the tasks of a 
central bank is also to prevent deflation-
ary trends.
  Recent experience of low rates of infla-
tion, and in some countries even negative 
inflation, have changed this stance some-
what. The ECB has therefore taken the 
occasion of its strategic review in spring 
of this year to fine-tune its goals. It made 
it clear that price stability in the medium 
term  had  to  be  maintained  and  that 
price stability means maintaining infla-
tion “below” but “close” to 2%. In my 
estimation there can be little doubt that 
the public has received and understood 
this message. 
  While clarity about goals is important, 
it is not the only consideration. A clear 
strategy, coupled with transparency in 
the implementation and communication 
of  monetary  policy,  are  two  further 
important facets. I think there is agree-
ment in principle that a clear strategy is 
desirable. When it comes to the details, 
however,  there  are  varying  opinions 
about  which  demands  such  a  strategy 
should meet.
  From the very outset, the ECB re-
cognised the significance of a transparent 
strategy. It also stressed, however, that 
the beginning of monetary union was 
burdened by particular imponderables. 
1see ECB: A guide to Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projection exercises, 2001
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  Inflation targeting is often described 
as the prototype for a particularly trans-
parent  strategy.  Many  authors  have 
stressed the virtues of such a strategy2. 
  I think, however, that there is still 
no  conclusive  evidence.  More  recent 
attempts to examine the superiority of 
this strategy empirically have also led 
to sobering results3. According to these 
studies, in general countries with such 
a strategy do not do any better or any 
worse, for that matter than countries 
which have used other approaches.
  In my opinion, one should not place 
too much significance on these results. 
Perhaps the tests used were inadequate, 
or maybe there was not enough attention 
paid to the particularities of the indi-
vidual countries etc. The results should 
nonetheless  serve  as  a  warning  that 
good monetary policy cannot be simply 
attributed to any one strategy concept. 
  I would now like to turn my atten-
tion to a third point, i.e. the implemen-
tation and communication of monetary 
policy measures. In the past few years 
central banks have, often in a pragmatic 
way, made efforts to make their oper-
ations and decisions more transparent. 
The FOMC is a perfect example. Since 
the middle of the 1990s, it has changed 
its  communication  policy  in  several 
steps. It seems that today the markets 
are much better at predicting changes in 
the Fed funds rate and do so far earlier 
than even in the first half of the 1990s. At 
the same time, longer-term interest rates 
are reacting less to changes in the official 
rates than was previously the case. This 
confirms that US monetary policy has 
become more predictable. 
  It is also true, however, that, meas-
ured  by  the  reactions  of  the  market, 
changes in the official interest rate even 
today are not entirely free of surprise 
effects. Studies conducted for the ECB 
as  well  as  for  the  Bundesbank  have 
produced similar results.
  As I said at the beginning, it is certainly 
important that central banks behave in such 
a way that the private sector understands 
them.  Important  aspects  include  clear 
goals, efforts to promote clear strategies as 
well as easy-to-understand communiqués. 
Markets will take over a good part of the 
central  bank’s  work,  provided  that  its 
policies and behaviour are transparent. 
  Even so, there is still a lot of work 
for central banks to do. Central banks 
have had and will continue to have the 
important  task  of  accurately  assessing 
the  situation  in  the  economy  and, 
for example, of correctly reading the 
expectations of the markets.
  I hope we made some progress in this 
respect. In the past few years, central 
banks have learnt to improve the use they 
make of information derived from mar-
ket behaviour for their own purposes. 
The developments in the financial mar-
kets permit us, for example, not only to 
assess the expectation value of interest 
rate and exchange rate changes but also 
to assess the entire distribution and to 
say something about the uncertainties of 
expectations. As a result, we are better 
able  to  understand  today  how,  for 
example, our interest rate measures are 
received by the markets. 
  However, our knowledge of market 
developments will remain limited in the 
future. Our strategies have to take account 
of this fact. In the past, one important 
criterion used to evaluate strategies was 
the extent to which a central bank must 
rely on information when setting mone-
tary policy. This aspect was also discussed 
with regard to the public’s ability to test 
and learn about a given policy.
  The danger of central banks placing 
too much trust in their information has 
been emphasised time and again. Expe-
rience  has  shown,  for  example,  that 
data available to the central banks are 
inadequate.  This  argument  has  been 
given considerable weight in connection 
with some monetary policy rules which 
are  popular  among  economists  today. 
It seems to me that we have yet to find 
the correct answer to such difficulties. 
Should  we  try  to  minimise  errors  by 
using as much information as possible 
and making as many cross checks as pos-
sible or should we rather favour “robust” 
strategies which make do with less, but 
more reliable information.
 
  I hope that all of this has made it clear 
that we at the central banks still face many 
unanswered questions. We will not solve 
these  problems  without  a  considerable 
amount of research. I am therefore happy 
to see that the discourse between central 
banks and university researchers in Europe 
has intensified in the past few years. This 
conference is a sign of such progress. I 
hope you will find the papers presented 
in the next two days interesting and that a 
lively discussion will ensue.
2 see, for example, B. Bernanke et al, Inflation targeting: Lessons from international experience, Princeton 1999 
3 see L. Ball, N. Sheridan: Does inflation targeting matter? IMF working paper, 2003, M. Neumann, J. von Hagen:                     
   Does inflation targeting matter?, Fed St Louis Review, 2002
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of the time, we make a conscious choice 
not to learn about many developments;   
I noted this morning how some of the 
presenters failed to learn how to move 
their transparencies around an overhead 
projector in order to make them legible 
to the audience. Again my father used to 
tell a story about an icthyologist, who 
was appointed Vice Chancellor of a Uni-
versity. He tried to learn the names of 
all the faculty, but every time he learned 
a faculty name he forgot that of a fish. 
And  as  an  academic,  he  preferred  to 
maintain  his  academic  memory,  and 
therefore gave up trying to learn faculty 
names.
  The point of all that is that there is an 
equilibrium amount of learning, which 
depends on the costs of learning relative 
to the time involved and the utility of 
doing  something  else.  One  could, 
indeed, envisage a production function, 
in which time was allocated between   
labour, leisure and learning; and indeed 
such  a  production  function  would 
in my view be an advance on what is 
currently done. Given that learning is 
a costly activity, one of the issues that 
needs to be addressed is what is the least 
cost, most inexpensive way to learn.   
I  should  add  that  the  application  of 
recursive least squares to time series, 
which  is  what  has  been  suggested  in 
several of the papers here, is certainly 
not for most people a serious least cost 
way of learning! What do we normally 
do when we are ignorant? One common 
response is to ask a friend, or alterna-
tively we go to somebody else whose 
knowledge  on  the  subject  is  rather 
greater  than  our  own.  For  example, 
when sent a letter in German, rather 
than learn German from scratch, I ask 
a German-speaking friend to translate 
it for me. That means that a process in 
which  people  are  not  endowed  with 
complete knowledge, but need to learn, 
will  inevitably  involve  interpersonal 
interactions, with resulting information 
cascades  and  herding;  so  that  issues 
arising  from  such  interactions,  i.e. 
herding, need to be incorporated into   
studies of the learning process.
  Furthermore,  the  effort  put  into 
learning will not be constant, but will 
be  time-varying  and  state  dependent. 
Go back to my example about learning 
a foreign language, e.g. German. If my 
job was such that I had to go and live in 
Frankfurt or Berlin, then my application 
to  learning  German  would  certainly 
increase dramatically. And of course it is 
exactly the same with economics. When 
economic developments are calm, and 
there are fairly steady trends involved, 
then most of us will be perfectly happy 
  I have always found the concept of 
Rational  Expectations  quite  difficult, 
partly since we all perceive reality some-
what differently. I am not sure whether 
it  is  the  same  in  other  countries  and 
cultures,  but  the  British  rather  enjoy 
making a joke of the differences whereby 
the same event, or situation, is perceived 
by different actors. In particular, there is 
a declension proceeding from the initial 
actor, or agent, who is naturally proud of 
his, or her, activities; through to some-
one he meets face to face, who is careful 
in responding to that actor; and finally 
there is a third, anonymous person, who 
can give his, or her, critical, sometimes   
excessively  critical,  opinions  on  the 
standing of the initial actor. 
In the case of economic research,    
such a declension goes: –
  “My research is of path-breaking   
  originality;”
   “Your research is certainly very  
  interesting;”
  “His research is so bad that no self-
  respecting journal should publish it.”
In the case of teaching, a similar    
declension would be: –
   “I am an inspiring teacher;”
   “You certainly prepare your    
  material thoroughly;”
   “He is a pedantic bore.”
As a slight digression, let me share    
a very English such declension, 
which I read in a newspaper recently: –
   “I think I am wonderful;”
   “You are in love with yourself;”
   “She is the Duchess of York.”
For the purpose of tonight‘s declension, 
this might go: –
   “I speak my mind;”
   “You have every right to be heard;”
   “He is a prejudiced old fool.”
  Let  me  start  with  the  question  of 
learning. Much of this Conference deals 
with  the  issue  of  how  people  might 
learn. The point that I want to empha-
size here is that learning has considerable 
costs, particularly in time and effort. For 
example, I was speaking to several other 
members of this Conference at break-
fast, and none of us had any knowledge 
of German. Of course German is, obvi-
ously, perfectly possible to learn, but 
none of us had done so. Why not? The 
answer  is  essentially  that  our  time  is   
limited and constrained, and the costs 
of  learning  German,  (in  terms  of  the 
opportunities thereby missed for learn-
ing something else of greater utility to us, 
or for undertaking other actions to earn 
income, or for leisure purposes), were 
greater than we were prepared to spend 
on linguistic learning efforts. So, much 
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would surely have been overwhelming. 
Yet  none  have  been  written.  Indeed 
the volatility of inflation and output has 
been at an all-time low, as the evidence 
collected  by  Luca  Benati  has  clearly   
evidenced. The question is why? 
  Now I would like to say that all this is 
due to the wise decisions of the MPC, 
but I do not think that I can. Why not?   
For one thing, the rule of thumb, by 
which we have tried to assess the effects 
on economic outcomes of a change in 
interest  rates,  suggested  that  a  1% 
change in nominal interest rates would 
lead to a change of about a 0.33% in real 
output after a lag of 4 quarters and to a 
change of 0.3% of inflation after about 
8 quarters.  Since 1997 interest rates 
in the UK have varied between about 
7% and about 3%.  This means that, by 
our rule of thumb on the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, that we 
have at the most pushed real output and 
inflation relative to a no change course 
by about 1%.
  This rule of thumb, however, may 
now underestimate the effect of changes 
in nominal interest rates since inflation 
expectations  are  now  much  better 
anchored, and therefore a given change 
in  nominal  interest  rates  may  have  a 
greater effect on real interest rates. The 
Kurtz/Jin paper, however, is so pessi-
mistic  about  the  likelihood  of  benefi-
cent stabilising expectations, that they 
would  have  the  authorities  seriously 
considering whether to abandon discre-
tionary policy altogether! Certainly the 
authorities have to work hard at their 
communications  in  order  to  explain 
to use some rule of thumb, and/or to 
obtain our expectations of the future 
from some outside guru, or supposed 
expert commentator. It is only when 
there  are  some  dramatic,  and  unex-
pected,  shocks  and  events,  such  as  a 
quadrupling of oil prices, that it will 
be worth people‘s while to spend the 
time  and  effort  to  carefully  examine 
what  the  likely  effect  of  such  shocks 
on  future  developments  might  be. 
Thus  I  have  always  seen  a  likelihood 
that  during  periods  of  stability  the   
proportion  of  backwards-looking 
expectations will tend to rise, whereas 
when  economics  conditions  become 
more  unsettled,  the  proportion  of 
forwards-looking  expectations  will 
increase. The standard assumption, that 
this proportion is constant, strikes me as 
clearly incorrect.
  Let me next go on to conside the 
variance of projections of future economic 
outcomes, for example the kind of fan 
chart that is produced in the Bank of   
England‘s  Inflation  Report.  You  will 
recall  the  new  Governor,  Mervyn 
King‘s,  words  at  the  time  when  the 
Monetary Policy Committee was first 
established, that the 1% bands around 
our central target `would restore the 
lost art of English letter writing‘. 
  And so all of us thought at the outset, 
when the MPC began. Moreover, the 
paper  by  Cogley  and  his  colleagues, 
indicates that if you take proper Bayesian 
account of drifting parameters, model 
uncertainty,  policy  regime  changes, 
structural shifts, such factors as misper-
ceptions  of  the  underlying  economy, 
such as the Orphanides/Williams mis-
estimates of the Natural Rate, and so on, 
then their estimate of the Bayesian VAR 
probability of being outside the range 
of 2%, wherein no letter needs to be 
written, at the end of this year, 2003, 
from a forecast undertaken in 2002, Q4, 
would be 0.34, or more than twice the 
estimate that the Bank made at that time, 
which was for 0.14. By the same token 
the BVAR estimate made by Cogley and 
his colleagues for end-2004, from the 
forecast in 2003, Q4, was 0.45 of being 
outside the 2% range, compared with 
the Bank‘s 0.18.
  The Cogley paper suggests that the 
Bank‘s methods may tend to underes-
timate variance; but the extraordinary 
feature of the, admittedly short, historical 
experience of the MPC has been that no 
letters at all have yet been written. If we 
applied the Cogley, et al, procedures to 
each of the forecasts separately, then the 
probability that many letters would have 
been written between 1997 and now, 
Charles Goodhart, 
Reiner König 
(Deutsche Bundesbank)
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  Note that if decision-makers aim to 
adjust interest rates at each forecast so 
that, if then kept constant, the target 
inflation rate should be hit at the hori-
zon, then, subject to a few qualifications 
which I believe to be of minor impor-
tance, short-term interest rates should 
approximately  follow  a  random-walk 
path. But they have not done so. They 
have moved in just an autocorrelated and 
smooth a way since the Monetary Policy 
Committee started in the UK, as they had 
before. Why is this? Glenn Rudebusch 
and I worry about why this is so. Alex 
Cukierman,  in  an  intervention  today, 
attributed  this  autocorrelation  to  an 
auto-correlated series of errors by fore-
casters. I completely agree. My belief is 
that the autocorrelation lies in the errors 
of forecasters, and not as an aspect of the 
decision-making procedures of MPCs. 
For  example,  the  FOMC  has  taken  a 
series of 13 downward steps since the 
end of the IT boom, and the start of the 
recession in the US. Were these 13 con-
secutive similar steps planned from the 
outset by the FOMC, perhaps in order to 
introduce greater inertia into short-term 
interest rates? My answer to that is cer-
tainly no! The series of small downwards 
steps occurred because the forecasters 
were  continuously  expecting  that  the 
US economy would recover more, and 
more quickly, than actually occurred. 
  Everywhere in these papers uncer-
tainty is rightly emphasized, for exam-
ple,  parameter  uncertainty,  model 
uncertainty,  etc.;  everywhere  except 
the preferences of the decision-makers. 
These are assumed to be known, fixed, 
and,  what  is  more,  quadratic.  Let  us 
start with the fact that most decisions 
are taken by committees. I can promise 
you that with a committee containing   
M. King, D. Julius, S. Wadhwani and 
W. Buiter, there is no such thing as a 
representative  committee  member. 
More  seriously,  theorists  have  simply 
failed to come to terms with the fact 
that  decisions  are  taken  by  commit-
tees. What difference does this make? 
Moreover,  the  membership  of  such 
committees  is  continuously  changing. 
What will happen, for example, when 
Greenspan eventually steps down from 
the FOMC? Is that not, perhaps, one of 
the more important market uncertainties 
at the moment?
  Another  key  feature  of  decision-
making  by  Central  Banks,  and  by 
Governments, is that the decision-makers 
are agents; their principals in the case of 
independent Central Banks are Parlia-
ment, and in the case of Governments 
are  the  electorate  as  a  whole.  There 
is generally some kind of implicit, or 
explicit,  contract  whereby  the  agent, 
their actions and response functions, and 
they sometimes get it wrong, as perhaps 
evidenced  by  recent  bond  market 
gyrations. Nevertheless, the interaction 
between the private sector‘s expecta-
tions and the Central Bank‘s policy is 
one that has to be carefully assessed by 
the decision-makers in the Central Bank, 
and is, in principle, amenable to good 
communications skills.
  In  any  case,  even  if  inflationary 
expectations are now better anchored, 
the  foreign  exchange  market  has 
become, if anything, even more fitful 
and  wayward.  Uncovered  interest 
parity (UIP) continues to work, if at all, 
in reverse, and there seems no reliable 
link between interest rate changes and 
those of exchange rates. Hence much 
more  weight  has  had  to  be  put  on 
domestic transmission mechanisms, and 
this has meant in effect the housing mar-
ket. We have replaced an equity bubble 
with a housing market bubble, and how 
we get out of that imbalance, no one 
quite knows. But that is another story.
  What surprised me was the general 
tone of scepticism, and indeed of mild 
pessimism, about Inflation Targeting 
in many of the papers here. It may work 
in  practice,  but  not  in  theory.  Take 
the constant interest rate forecasts that 
most of us with inflation targets actu-
ally use. Honkapohja and Mitra claim, 
in a paper that I found quite difficult 
to  follow,  that  such  procedures  lead 
to  indeterminancy  of  equilibria  and   
instability under learning. What is the 
evidence of that? 
  My own main reason for supporting 
such a constant-interest rate forecasting 
procedure is that it improves the behav-
iour of the decision-makers themselves. 
They tend to be subject to the com-
mon fallacy that current conditions are 
extremely, indeed `uniquely‘, uncertain, 
and that by waiting to observe future 
outcomes,  then  current  uncertainties 
will be dispelled. And of course they are, 
but they just get replaced by future (and 
unforeseeable) uncertainties. The `let us 
wait and see‘ syndrome led, in my view, 
to the tendency towards varying inter-
est rates `too little, too late‘. It was this 
tendency to defer taking actions until 
the situation became clearer, which of 
course it never did, that was one of the 
main causes, in my view, of the process 
that  led  to  increasing  inflation  in  the 
post-war world. The constant interest 
rate forecast, aiming to hit the target at a 
given horizon, acts, I believe, as a sover-
eign counter to that `too little, too late‘ 
pathology.
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if  the  probability  and  extent  of  such 
a risk is also a function of the policy 
instrument, then the policy choice can 
be quite complex. May I recommend a 
recent paper which Lars Svensson gave 
at Chuck Freedman‘s recent Festschrift 
at the Bank of Canada to you for reading 
on this subject. 
  So, to conclude, what do I want you 
theorists to do?
(1) I  want  you  to  explain  why  infla-
tion targeting has worked so well, and 
why the variances in the outcomes have 
actually  been  much  smaller  than  we 
expected at the outset.
(2) I want you to be more careful about 
the decision-making procedure. It is done 
by a committee, who in turn are agents. 
That means that they are likely to have 
an agenda of their own to meet, arising 
from principal/agent considerations.
(3) I want you to focus on the problems 
of  dealing  with  asymmetric  risk,  i.e. 
skew, rather than variance, as the main 
concern  in  the  process  of  reaching  a 
policy decision.
  That said, I want to end by applauding 
the  coming  together  of  theory  and 
practice in this general field. Before I 
left to come here to this Conference, 
I  was  talking  to  the  Governor  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  Mervyn  King,  who 
asked  me  to  get  the  collected  papers 
and send them to him for him to read. 
Although Mervyn is, no doubt, some-
thing  of  an  outlier  in  this  respect, 
understanding and discussions between 
economic  analysts  and  Central  Bank 
practitioners has become much closer 
in  recent  decades  than  it  was  at  the 
beginning of the 1960s when I started 
doing economics. Then economists did 
not  seem  to  understand  what  central 
bankers  were  doing,  or  why  they 
were doing it. And equivalently central 
bankers took no notice, and had very   
little  appreciation,  of  the  arguments 
and analyses of economists. Since then 
in the field of monetary policy, analyses 
and practice have become much more 
closely  interactive  and  supportive 
of each other. That has been a great 
advance, and one of the real pleasures 
of my professional life.
the  Central  Bank  or  Government, 
will  either  do  well  enough,  and  be 
reappointed, or if it fails to pass some 
test of competence, will get kicked out, 
(except,  of  course,  for  the  European 
Central Bank (ECB) which cannot be 
so disciplined). Anyhow, this kind of 
principal/agent contracting relationship 
appears  nowhere  in  the  preference   
function. I think that it should. 
  Let me give you an analogy from a 
game that I like, Bridge. Assume that 
you just bought the contract. How do 
you play? Assume that after the opening 
lead, your partner tables her cards, and 
you smile (inwardly only of course, so 
as not to inform the opponents), since 
it should be easy to make your contract 
if the cards lie at all well. What should 
you do? A good Bridge player would 
consider  a  safety  play  how  to  bring 
home the contract even if malevolent 
nature has given a bad, or perhaps even 
the worst possible state of nature, to the 
other unseen cards; in other words in 
such a case a good Bridge player would 
follow a minimax, or robust policy.
  But  what  do  you  do  if,  after  the 
opening  lead,  your  partner  tables  a 
horrible, poor set of cards. After the 
polite `thank you partner‘, (and inward 
curse), what you ought to do is to work 
out what favourable distributions might, 
even so, let you make the contract; and 
you  should  play  for  that,  even  if  the 
more likely distributions might result in 
an extra lost trick, or even two.
  In other words, you are risk averse 
under good conditions, and risk loving 
under bad. The curvature of the loss 
function varies as your state varies. This 
was the theme of the paper in the Finan-
cial  Markets  Group  Discussion  Paper 
series  by  Margaret  Bray,  and  myself, 
whose title was `You might as well be 
hung for a sheep as a lamb‘; and we 
reflected the varying curvature in a loss 
function which had an inverse normal 
distribution.
  As a generality, the projected var-
iance  of  outcomes  is  much  less  of  a 
problem  for  decision-makers  than  is 
skew, asymmetric risk. If uncertainty is 
symmetric, then the decision-maker goes 
for the central tendency, and whether 
the  exponent  in  the  loss  -function  is 
quadratic, unity, or below unity, as the 
experimental  work  of  Kahneman  and 
Tversky suggests, does not really matter 
very much. In the MPC, for example, 
we never spent much time discussing 
variance, but we spent a large amount 
of effort in assessing skewed risks, and 
how to respond to them. Particularly 
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Paper Abstracts
Monetary Policy, Indeterminacy  
and Learning 
Escapist Policy Rules
Performance of Inﬂation Targeting Based On 
Constant Interest Rate Projections
 
Imperfect Knowledge,  
Inﬂation Expectations, and Monetary Policy
Permanent and Transitory Policy Shocks in 
an Empirical Macro Model with Asymmetric 
Information
The Role of Expectations in  
Economic Fluctuations and the Efﬁcacy  
of Monetary Policy
Policy Evaluation in Uncertain  
Economic Environments 
Bayesian Fan Charts for U.K. Inﬂation:
Forecasting and Sources of Uncertainty in an 
Evolving Monetary System
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Athanasios Orphanides
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  We study a simple, microfounded 
macroeconomic  system  in  which  the 
monetary authority employs a Taylor-
type policy rule. We analyze situations 
in which the self-confirming equilibrium 
is  unique  and  learnable  according  to 
Bullard and Mitra (2002). We explore 
the prospects for the use of‚ large devia-
tion‘ theory in this context, as employed 
by Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams, 
and Sargent (2002). We show that our 
system can sometimes depart from the 
self-confirming  equilibrium  towards  a 
non-equilibrium outcome characterized 
by  persistently  low  nominal  interest 
rates and persistently low inflation. Thus 
we generate events that have some of the 
properties of “liquidity traps” observed 
in the data, even though the policymaker 
remains  committed  to  a  Taylor-type 
policy rule which otherwise has desirable 
stabilization properties.
The paper was discussed by:
Leopold von Thadden    
(Deutsche Bundesbank) 
  Monetary  policy  is  sometimes 
formulated  in  terms  of  a  target  level 
of inflation, a fixed time horizon and a 
constant interest rate that is anticipated 
to  achieve  the  target  at  the  specified 
horizon.  These  requirements  lead  to 
constant interest rate (CIR) instrument 
rules. Using the standard New Keynesian 
model, it is shown that some forms of 
CIR policy lead to both indeterminacy of 
equilibria and instability under adaptive 
learning. However, some other forms 
of CIR policy perform better. We also 
examine the properties of the different 
policy rules in the presence of inertial 
demand and price behaviour.
The paper was discussed by:
Anders Vredin 
(Sveriges Riksbank), 
Giuseppe Ferrero 
(Banca d’Italia) 
            
Performance of Inflation  
Targeting Based  
On Constant Interest  
Rate Projections
Seppo Honkapohja 
(University of Helsinki)  
Kaushik Mitra  
(Royal Holloway College,  
University of London)
Escapist Policy Rules
James Bullard   
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)  
In-Koo Cho  
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The development of tractable for-
ward looking models of monetary policy 
has lead to an explosion of research on 
the implications of adopting Taylor-type 
interest rate rules. 
  Indeterminacies  have  been  found 
to arise for some specifications of the 
interest rate rule, raising the possibility 
of  inefficient  fluctuations  due  to  the 
dependence of expectations on extrane-
ous “sunspots”. Separately, recent work 
by a number of authors has shown that 
sunspot equilibria previously thought to 
be unstable under private agent learning 
can in some cases be stable when the 
observed  sunspot  has  a  suitable  time 
series structure. In this paper we gen-
eralize the “common factor” technique, 
used in this analysis, to examine standard 
monetary models that combine forward 
looking expectations and predetermined 
variables. We consider a variety of spec-
ifications that incorporate both lagged 
and  expected  inflation  in  the  Phillips 
Curve, and both expected inflation and 
inertial elements in the policy rule. 
  We find that some policy rules can 
indeed lead to learnable sunspot solu-
tions and we investigate the conditions 
under which this phenomenon arises.
The paper was discussed by:
Stephen G.F. Hall 
(Imperial College, University of London), 
Julien Matheron 
(Banque de France)  
Monetary Policy,  
Indeterminacy and Learning
George W. Evans  
(University of Oregon)
Bruce McGough 
(Oregon State University)
Bruce McGough
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  Despite a large literature document-
ing that the efficacy of monetary policy 
depends on how inflation expectations 
are  anchored,  many  monetary  policy 
models assume: (1) the inflation target 
of  monetary  policy  is  constant;  and, 
(2) the inflation target is known by all 
economic agents. This paper proposes an 
empirical specification with two policy 
shocks: permanent changes to the infla-
tion target and transitory perturbations 
of the short-term real rate. The public 
sector  cannot  correctly  distinguish 
between these two shocks and, under 
incomplete learning, private perceptions 
of the inflation target will not equal the 
true target. 
  The  paper  shows  how  imperfect 
policy  credibility  can  affect  economic 
responses to structural shocks, including 
transition to a new inflation target – a 
question  that  cannot  be  addressed  by 
many  commonly  used  empirical  and 
theoretical models. In contrast to models 
where  all  monetary  policy  actions 
are  transient,  the  proposed  specifica-
tion implies that sizable movements in 
historical bond yields and inflation are 
attributable to perceptions of permanent 
shocks in target inflation.
The paper was discussed by:
William Branch  
(College of William and Mary) 
Michael Binder (University of Frankfurt 
and Center for Financial Studies)
Permanent and Transitory 
Policy Shocks in an 
Empirical Macro Model with 
Asymmetric Information
Sharon Kozicki  
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City)  
Peter Tinsley (University of Cambridge)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  This paper investigates the role that 
imperfect knowledge about the structure 
of the economy plays in the formation of 
expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, 
and the efficient formulation of monetary 
policy. 
  Economic agents rely on an adap-
tive  learning  technology  to  form 
expectations  and  to  update  continu-
ously their beliefs regarding the dynam-
ic structure of the economy based on 
incoming data. The process of perpet-
ual  learning  introduces  an  additional 
layer  of  dynamic  interaction  between 
monetary  policy  and  economic  out-
comes. We find that policies that would 
be efficient under rational expectations 
can perform poorly when knowledge is 
imperfect. In particular, policies that fail 
to maintain tight control over inflation 
are prone to episodes in which the pub-
lic‘s  expectations  of  inflation  become 
uncoupled from the policy objective and 
stagflation results, in a pattern similar 
to that experienced in the United States 
during the 1970s. Our results highlight 
the value of effective communication of 
a central bank‘s inflation objective and 
of continued vigilance against inflation 
in anchoring inflation expectations and 
fostering macroeconomic stability.
The paper was discussed by:
Alex Cukierman 
(Tel Aviv University)
Imperfect Knowledge,  
Inflation Expectations, and 
Monetary Policy
 
Athanasios Orphanides  
(Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC) 
 John C. Williams 
(Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)
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     This paper describes some approaches 
to macroeconomic policy evaluation in 
the presence of uncertainty about the 
structure  of  the  environment  under 
study.  The  perspective  we  discuss  is 
designed to facilitate policy evaluation 
for  several  forms  of  uncertainty.  For 
example, our approach may be used when 
an  analyst  is  unsure  about  the  appro-
priate economic theory that should be 
assumed; it may also be employed when 
an analyst is unsure about the particular 
functional forms that translate a general 
theory into a form amenable to statis-
tical  analysis.  As  such,  these  methods 
are, we believe, particularly useful in a 
range of macroeconomic contexts where 
there  are  fundamental  disagreements 
as to the determinants of the problem 
under study. In addition, this approach 
recognizes that even if one agrees on 
the  underlying  economic  theory  that 
describes a phenomenon, policy evalu-
ation often requires taking a stance on 
details  of  the  economic  environment 
such as lag lengths and functional form 
that are not specified by  the theory. 
  As  such,  our  analysis  is  motivated 
by similar concerns as led to the devel-
opment of model calibration methods. 
Unlike the usual calibration approach, 
we do not reject formal statistical infer-
ence  methods  but  rather  incorporate 
model uncertainty into them.
The paper was discussed by:
Marc Giannoni 
(Columbia University)
Policy Evaluation in Uncer-
tain Economic Environments
William A. Brock, Steven Durlauf,
Kenneth West
(all University of Wisconsin)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  We show diverse beliefs is an impor-
tant propagation mechanism of fluctua-
tions, money non neutrality and efficacy 
of  monetary  policy.  Since  expecta-
tions affect demand, our theory shows 
economic fluctuations are mostly driven 
by varying demand not supply shocks. 
Using a competitive model with flexible 
prices  in  which  agents  hold  Rational 
Belief (see Kurz (1994)) we show that 
(i)  our  economy  replicates  well  the 
empirical record of fluctuations in the 
U.S. (ii) Under monetary rules with-
out discretion, monetary policy has a 
strong stabilization effect and an aggres-
sive anti-inflationary policy can reduce 
inflation  volatility  to  zero.  (iii)  The 
statistical  Phillips  Curve  changes  sub-
stantially  with  policy  instruments  and 
activist policy rules render it vertical. 
(iv) Although prices are flexible, money 
shocks result in less than proportional 
changes  in  inflation  hence  the  aggre-
gate  price  level  appears  “sticky”  with 
respect to money shocks. (v) Discretion 
in  monetary  policy  adds  a  random 
element  to  policy  and  increases  vola-
tility. The impact of discretion on the 
efficacy  of  policy  depends  upon  the 
structure of market beliefs about future 
discretionary  decisions.  We  study 
two rationalizable beliefs. In one case, 
market  beliefs  weaken  the  effect  of 
policy and in the second, beliefs bolster 
policy outcomes and discretion could be 
a desirable attribute of the policy rule. 
Since the central bank does not know 
any more than the private sector, real 
social gain from discretion arise only in 
extraordinary cases. Hence, the weight 
of the argument leads us to conclude 
that bank‘s policy should be transparent 
and abandon discretion except for rare 
and  unusual  circumstances.  (vi)  An   
implication of our model suggests the 
current effective policy is only mildly 
activist  and  aims  mostly  to  target 
inflation. 
The paper was discussed by:
Margaret Bray 
(London School of Economics), 
Maik Heinemann  
(University of Hannover)
The Role of Expectations  
in Economic Fluctuations 
and the Efficacy of  
Monetary Policy
Mordecai Kurz 
(Hehui Jin) 
Maurizio Motolese 
(Stanford University)
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   We  estimate  a  Bayesian  vector 
autoregression for the U.K. with drifting 
coefficients  and  stochastic  volatilities. 
We use it to characterize posterior den-
sities for several objects that are useful 
for designing and evaluating monetary 
policy, including local approximations 
to the mean, persistence, and volatil-
ity  of  inflation.  We  present  diverse 
sources  of  uncertainty  that  impinge 
on the posterior predictive density for 
inflation, including model uncertainty, 
policy drift, structural shifts and other 
shocks.  We  use  a  recently  developed 
minimum  entropy  method  to  bring 
outside information to bear on inflation 
forecasts. We compare our predictive 
densities with the Bank of England‘s fan 
charts. 
The paper was discussed by:
Kenneth West  
(University of Wisconsin)
Sylvia Kaufmann  
(Austrian National Bank)
Bayesian Fan Charts  
for U.K. Inflation:  
Forecasting and Sources  
of  Uncertainty in  
an Evolving Monetary  
System
Timothy Cogley
Sergei Morozov
(both Stanford University)
Thomas J. Sargent
(New York University and Hoover Institution)36